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Listing Standards and Fraud 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 Statistics reporting litigated cases of fraud on an exchange-by-exchange basis are not 
readily available to investors.  This paper introduces data from three countries with multiple 
exchanges operating under different listing standards, – Canada, the United Kingdom and the 
United States –  to show litigated cases of fraud significantly vary by country, and the different 
exchanges within the country.  Comparisons are also made to Brazil, China and Germany to 
assess out-of-sample inferences.  The data examined suggest there are significant differences in 
the nature of observed fraud across exchanges within the United States; by contrast, outside the 
United States there appears to be a comparative lack of enforcement.  The data also suggest 
policy implications for the ways in which fraud should ideally be reported to improve investor 
knowledge, market transparency and market quality. 
 
 
Keywords: Corporate fraud; Exchange listing standards, Securities commissions, NYSE, 
NASDAQ, TSX, TSXV, LSE, AIM, PinkSheets 
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1. Introduction 
 
Reports of fraud, particularly among individuals, funds and companies that act on behalf 
of other people, attract significant media attention and public outrage. Fraud within financial 
markets erodes investors trust, and in turn influences stock market liquidity and performance 
(Karpoff et al., 2008a; Srinivasan, 2005). Expected fraud is a risk that should be priced in a well-
functioning market (Farber, 2005; Karpoff et al., 2008a,b). Yet, are investors really aware of how 
common fraud actually is, and how different types of fraud differ across exchanges and across 
countries?  
 
This paper examines reported cases of fraud on exchanges in Canada (Toronto Stock 
Exchange (“TSX”) and Toronto Stock Exchange - Ventures (“TSXV”)), the United Kingdom 
(London Stock Exchange (“LSE”) and the Alternative Investment Market (“AIM”)), and the 
United States (New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), National Association of Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotations (“NASDAQ”), and the OTC Markets Group, informally known as the 
“PinkSheets”). We group fraud into eight different types, based on an analysis of observed 
litigated cases. We present new data that were assembled by recording information found within 
court documents, regulator announcements, and news reports from these three countries. The 
data highlight differences in frequency of litigated cases of fraud depending on the country and 
exchanges over the period January 2005 to June 2011. The evidence addresses the question as to 
whether there is a need for regulators to account for different levels of litigated fraud on different 
exchanges, and to make this information available to the average investor that seeks to 
understand risks associated with investing in different products. 
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 The frequency of fraud cases can be explained by differences in listing standards on an 
exchange and in turn the composition of companies listed on the exchange, as well as differences 
in surveillance and enforcement.  Despite the widespread fascination with fraud and its well-
documented influence on stock prices, liquidity and market quality, there is little or no direct 
source of evidence on actual litigated cases of fraud that enable an investor to compare different 
jurisdictions, or even different exchanges within the same jurisdiction. Note some examples: 
 
 In the United States (“U.S.”), there is no summary document made available to investors 
that enable investors to compare fraud cases on NYSE versus NASDAQ, or to draw 
comparison with the PinkSheets.1 We show fraud litigation cases per year involving 
NYSE companies on average represent 1.9% of NYSE listings, but 4.5% of NASDAQ 
listings and over 5% of PinkSheet listings.  
 
 A review of fraud cases in Canada, the United Kingdon (“U.K.”) and the U.S. shows 
eight major types of cases: financial fraud, non-financial misrepresentation and disclosure 
fraud, illegal distributions, bribery, pump-and-dump, wash / matched / improper trade / 
marketing the close, insider trading, and delinquent in filings with the Commission.  In 
the U.S., all types of fraud are consistently more common on NASDAQ than NYSE (with 
the sole exception of bribery, where there is a trivially higher frequency of bribery among 
NASDAQ than NYSE companies).  PinkSheet company fraud, by contrast, is dominated 
by illegal distribution cases and cases involving delinquent filings with the Commission. 
                                                 
1 In this report unless otherwise explicitly stated we refer to all classes of OTC and PinkSheet companies as the 
‘PinkSheets’ following the conventional use of the term. 
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 Investors should care about fraud.  For example, for financial misconduct, firms lose 41% 
of their market value on average (Karpoff et al. 2008b).  Financial fraud comprises 7.79% 
of NASDAQ listings and 2.01% of NYSE companies.  This implies an expected cost of 
3.2% of the value of a NASDAQ listing and 0.8% of the value of a NYSE listing.  Given 
the absence of reporting of differences in fraud across exchanges, it is unclear whether or 
not investors take this into account for their investment and/or pricing decisions.  
 
 In Canada, there is no ready document that enables an investor to make comparisons of 
litigated fraud between the senior TSX versus the TSXV. Likewise, in the U.K. there is 
no readily available basis to compare litigated fraud on the senior LSE with the junior 
AIM. We show fraud cases involving TSX companies represent on average 0.3% of TSX 
listings and 0.1% of TSXV listings. Fraud cases involving LSE companies represent 
0.4% of LSE listings and 0.1% of AIM listings.  These differences are best explained by 
the comparative problems with enforcement with Canada’s fragmented securities 
commissions.   
 
 An increase in minimum capitalization requirements by 1-standard deviation is associated 
with a reduction in the total number of initiated fraud cases by 27.4%, and a reduction in 
the total number of sanctioned cases by 45.8% relative to the average number of cases in 
each exchange-year in the data. 
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 While there is no central source of data to compare other markets, hand gathering 
information reveals some interesting facts from other exchanges. For instance, Brazil 
only just completed its first insider trading case in 2011. The defunct Neur Markt had 
merely 4 confirmed cases of fraud and 25 documented rumors of suspected fraud in its 
brief history. By contrast, there are plenty of litigated cases of fraud in China, 
representing 3.8% of listed companies per year, and it is noteworthy that there are no 
material differences in listing standards between the Shanghai and Shenzen stock 
exchanges and, likewise, no material differences in fraud across these two exchanges. 
 
We stress the fact that litigated cases of fraud are not necessarily representative of actual 
cases of fraud. The difference between actual cases and litigated cases depend on rule setting 
(listing standards and exchange trading rules), surveillance (the people and technology available 
to detect fraud), and the quality of enforcement (the process and expenditures to enable cases to 
go forward and the effectiveness of courts). Our comparisons in this paper between Canada, the 
U.K. and the U.S. involve three jurisdictions that have similar exchange trading rules, 
surveillance technology, similar court structures, similar expenditures on enforcement per capita, 
and all follow common law traditions.   
 
Overall, the data highlight some key findings.  Within the U.S., there are pronounced 
differences in listing standards and higher listing standards are associated with fewer cases of 
fraud.  Pursuit of fraud by the SEC is arguably vigorous relative to other jurisdictions.  The very 
low level of detected fraud in Canada and the U.K. is perhaps best attributable to lower levels of 
enforcement in Canada and the U.K., or at least a different approach to enforcement without the 
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use of formal proceedings.  Also, we consider the possibility that the low level of detected fraud 
on AIM may be a result of a positive role for Nominated Advisers “NOMADs” in mitigating 
fraud, but we do not find significant evidence in support of this idea in the data. NOMADs are 
essentially the underwriters for AIM listings that are charged with the continuous supervision of 
such listings, a unique requirement of AIM. 
 
This paper is organized as follows.  The next section describes different types of fraud 
and differences in the regulatory environment in Canada, the U.K. and the U.S.  The third section 
introduces the data.  The fourth section provides multivariate tests.  The fifth section discusses 
additional robustness tests, extensions and future research.  The sixth section discusses additional 
insights from other jurisdictions such as China, Brazil and Germany. The seventh section 
provides a discussion of policy implications.  The final section provides policy implications and 
concludes. 
 
2. Fraud, Governance and Listing Standards 
 
In this section we review in the first subsection different types of fraud and provide 
examples of fraud in relation to listing standards from actual cases. Thereafter we explain the 
extent to which differences in listing standards and other regulatory factors exist among the 
seven markets in Canada (TSX and TSXV), the U.K. (LSE and AIM) and the U.S. (NYSE, 
NASDAQ and PinkSheets). Finally, in the last subsection we develop testable hypotheses based 
on the related literature on differences between junior and senior exchanges in terms of the risks 
and returns to investors, and the interplay between fraud and financial markets.  
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2.1. Types of Fraud and Motivating Examples 
 
 Securities fraud may be broadly grouped into different categories, and it is useful to do so 
for the purpose of understanding the nature of illegal activities carried out in different 
marketplaces. In this report we group fraud into one of eight different categories. 
 
 Financial Fraud: examples include revenue misstatements and options backdating. For 
example, in February 2011 the NASDAQ company, ArthroCare Corp., faced charges that 
it had materially overstated and prematurely recognized revenue to help the company 
reach aggressive internal revenue targets and satisfy analysts’ revenue expectations. 
Another example includes the NASDAQ company, SafeNet Inc., which faced SEC 
litigation in December 2009 for backdated options and quarterly earnings management. 
An example from Canada includes a 2009 case involving Research In Motion Ltd. 
(RIM), whereby three respondents from RIM agreed to pay $68,100,000 as part of one 
settlement agreement with the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) for inappropriate 
stock option granting practices to senior management.  
 
 Other Fraudulent misrepresentation and disclosure: examples include various types of 
misstatements to the public, including failure to put in place internal checks to avoid such 
material misrepresentations from happening, but excluding cases directly involving 
financial fraud given the separate category above. For example, in December 2008 
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PinkSheet company, GMC Holding Corp., faced SEC litigation for allegedly defrauding 
investors by issuing false press releases touting the company's development of a motor 
technology device capable of generating unlimited energy and its negotiations to sell this 
technology for hundreds of millions of dollars. 
 
 Illegal distribution: examples typically include companies or brokers offering to sell 
company stock without a valid registration statement. For instance, prior to its IPO in 
2004 and 2005, Google Inc. offered to sell and sold its securities without a registration 
statement filed or in effect and without a valid exemption from registration. 
 
 Bribery: examples typically involve bribery of government officials. For instance, in 
September 2008 NYSE-listed Halliburton Co. was involved in SEC litigation for its 
involvement to bribe Nigerian government officials over a 10-year period, in violation of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in order to obtain construction contracts. It paid a 
disgorgement fee of $177 million to settle the charges in 2009. 
 
 Insider Trading: involves trading on material non-public information. For example, in 
March 2011 there was SEC litigation involving NASDAQ company, MTC Technologies, 
Inc., involving trading prior to MTC's public announcement on Friday, December 21, 
2007, that it had entered into a definitive agreement to be acquired by BAE Systems, Inc. 
 
 Pump and dump: also known as a boiler room scheme, this scheme involves purchasing 
shares at successively higher prices and then subsequently manipulating the market by 
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reversing the positions obtained. This scheme may or may not involve contemporaneous 
false statements. For example, an individual named Daryl O. Anderson conducted a stock 
scalping scheme which involved Coudtech Sensors Inc., a PinkSheet company, and faced 
SEC litigation for the illegal practice of recommending that others purchase a security, 
while secretly selling the same security, contrary to the recommendation.  Here, the 
illegal practice is carried out by an individual but the harm to the company’s investors is 
notable and a sign that companies on certain exchanges are more prone to such abuse. 
 
 Other Types of Market Manipulation: examples of market manipulation apart from 
pump-and-dump schemes include wash trades (the same client reference is on both sides 
of the trade), pre-arranged matched trades (the client broker and another broker enter a 
bid and ask for the same volume and price, which then generates a trade between the two 
brokers for the whole of the volume, where the volume of the order is significant given 
the trading history of the security), and marking the close (selling of securities at the 
close of the market in an effort to alter the closing price of the security).2 An example of 
litigated market manipulation involves the PinkSheet company, High Country Bancorp 
Inc., which in April 2011 faced SEC litigation for “marking the close” in certain thinly-
traded securities by executing trades in the final minutes of the last trading day of the 
month with the intention of artificially affecting the securities’ closing prices. 
 
 Delinquent in its period filings with the Commission: this type of fraud simply involves 
companies that fail to file required documents to the SEC, Financial Services Authority 
                                                 
2 A complete list of these different types of market manipulation frauds is provided in Cumming and Johan (2008) 
and Cumming et al. (2011).  
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(FSA) in the U.K. or the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) in Canada. Also, it 
includes cases such as the December 2009 FSA case involving Simon Kuun, and the 
April 2010 FSA case involving Getco Europe Limited, both for failing to provide 
accurate and timely transaction reports to the FSA.  
 
2.2. Listing Standards and Other Regulatory Differences in Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. 
 
Listing rules, ongoing disclosure requirements and trading rules at all stock exchanges 
are readily available from exchange webpages. Listing standards vary significantly across 
exchanges in the U.S. For example, the NYSE requires pre-tax earnings of US$10 million over 
the 3 years prior to the IPO and US$25 million in each of the 2 years prior to the IPO, and 
requires a public float of US$100 million. The NASDAQ Capital Market requires pre-tax 
earnings of US$750,000 and a public float of US$5 million, while the NASDAQ National 
requires a public float of US$20 million (but no restriction on pre-tax earnings). 
 
The OTC Markets Group, informally known as the PinkSheets, is not a stock exchange 
according to the SEC, but does facilitate the exchange of securities between qualified 
independent brokers. There are no formal listing standards for the PinkSheets and the SEC does 
not regulate the PinkSheets.3 However, companies may nevertheless have to file financial 
statements with the SEC if they have 500 or more investors and US$10 million or more in assets, 
and if they list on the OTC Bulletin Board (OTCBB). Also, there are a number of unstated listing 
requirements for PinkSheets in terms of the practice for maintaining a listing,4 which include 
                                                 
3 See Securities and Exchange Commission (2011). 
4 http://www.venturelawcorp.com/listing_requirements_pink_sheets.htm  
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having a minimum of 40 stockholders of record holding one board lot each, not being a blank 
check company, having current financial information available to market makers and 
stockholders, and having a market maker submit 15c211 application to NASD and agree to act as 
market maker for securities of company. Further, foreign companies must have applied as 
exempt issuers under 12g3-2b with the SEC.  
 
There currently are two equity markets in Canada: the TSX, for senior equities and 
TSXV, the junior Venture exchange. TSXV requires pre-tax earnings of Can$100,000 and a 
public float of Can$1,000,000.5 The TSX requires pre-tax earnings of Can$300,000 and a public 
float of Can$4,000,000. 6  
 
The LSE and AIM have two tier markets – Primary Listed and Secondary Listed. Both 
Primary and Secondary Listed stocks on the LSE are required to have a minimum market 
capitalization of £700,000 and a minimum free float of 25%, or 25% of the total shares 
outstanding listed on the exchange. AIM has no listing standards in terms of a minimum float 
and minimum market capitalization. The Primary Listed on AIM are, however, required to have 
audited historical financial information for 3 years, 75% of the business supported by revenue 
earning record for the 3-year period prior to listing, control over the majority of assets for the 3-
year period, and a Sponsor (bank, stock broker or other professional sponsor); by contrast, the 
                                                 
5 The TSXV actually has a Tier 2 listing standard of $50,000 pre-tax earnings and $500,000 public float. Listing 
standards on the TSXV and its predecessors are not materially different.  
6 Note that the senior TSX also has a Technology Company Listing Standard and a Discretionary Listing category, 
both of which are more lax than the TSX standards. See Harris (2006).  
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Secondary Listed company on AIM is only required to have audited financial statements for the 
3-year period if available or whichever shorter history applies and no other similar requirement.7  
 
A unique feature of the AIM market is that it requires its companies to be subject to 
continuous oversight by its underwriter also known as a Nominated Adviser (“NOMAD”). AIM 
companies do not have admission documents pre-vetted by AIM itself or the FSA but rather by 
the NOMAD (virtually all AIM companies avoid the U.K. Listing Authority prospectus 
requirement, unlike LSE companies). NOMADs are required at all times for AIM companies, 
otherwise they will be suspended. NOMADs ensure disclosure of all price-sensitive material in a 
timely manner, as well as semi-annual reports. NOMADs ensure that AIM companies meet 
suitability requirements through qualitative assessment of the business plan, management team, 
and readiness to be public which involves things like valuation, accuracy of revenue forecasts 
and ability to make timely disclosures. NOMADs also test marketing with institutions and 
confirm director quality. NOMADs essentially act as a “front-line intermediary” between the 
exchange and the issuer company.  
 
AIM is similar to the TSXV in the sense that it is a junior “venture” exchange, but that is 
really where the similarity ends. It distinguishes itself in three important ways (Koyanagi, 2008). 
First, AIM is regulated by London Stock Exchange-AIM Regulation, a division of an exchange 
with a lighter touch relative to the TSXV which is an exchange and securities commission-
regulated market. Second, AIM is a Sarbanes-Oxley free zone, while TSXV is a Sarbanes-Oxley 
“light” zone. That is, in Canada, liability for violating disclosure obligations has been influenced 
                                                 
7 http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/main-market/documents/brochures/admission-and-
disclosure-standards.pdf .  
13 
 
by Sarbanes Oxley legislation, albeit with unique defenses and procedural safeguards within the 
Canadian rules that mitigate liability and the number of lawsuits found in the U.S. (Blakes, 
Cassels and Graydon LLP, 2010). Third, AIM does not require a prospectus, while TSXV does 
require a prospectus which is reviewed and approved by securities regulators prior to admission.  
 
The flexibility of junior markets such as TSXV and AIM has attracted significant interest 
among issuers and investors alike. For example, more money was raised on AIM in 2006 
(US$31 billion) than on NASDAQ (US$29 billion) (Securities and Exchange Commission, 
2010). In 2007, there were 207 IPOs on the TSX (raising Can$7.3 billion), 366 on the TSXV 
(Can$0.5 billion), 284 on AIM (US$14.2 billion) and 290 on NASDAQ (US$17.4 billion) 
(Securities and Exchange Commission, 2011).  
 
Historically speaking, the U.S. exchanges have been steadily losing their share of IPOs 
and public capital raising since 2001. In May 2011 the SEC approved NASDAQ’s new BX 
Venture Exchange.  Listing requirements for the BX Venture Exchange include 200,000 publicly 
held shares, 200 public shareholders, US$2 million market value for initial listing and US$1 
million for continued listing, two market-makers, a minimum listing price of US$1.00 per share 
and subsequent listing price not below US$0.25 per share, and if the company has not previously 
been listed on a national securities exchange then it must have US$1 million in shareholders’ 
equity or US$5 million in assets and a 1-year operating history with a plan to have sufficient 
working capital for another 12 months. This new development will enable much research on 
market quality in the U.S. in the future as data become available. In the meantime, comparisons 
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are possible between NYSE, NASDAQ, TSX, TSXV, LSE, AIM and the PinkSheets, as 
discussed below.  
 
2.3. Testable Hypotheses 
 
Our empirical tests below focus on the proposition that fraud differs across exchanges 
due to the characteristics of the exchange, and not merely due to market conditions and/or the 
characteristics of companies listed on the exchange.   
 
The most pronounced differences across the exchanges in Canada, the U.K. and the U.s. 
are the listing standards.  As discussed immediately above, listing standards are highest on the 
NYSE. Listing standards are somewhat comparable between NASDAQ and LSE, but arguably 
tighter on the LSE given the extra conditions such as a Sponsor. Listing standards are notably 
lower on the TSX, and even lower on the TSXV. The AIM market has lower financial listing 
standards among these recognized exchanges, but does nevertheless have a NOMAD 
requirement to enhance governance. Finally, the PinkSheets are not formally an exchange and 
has the lowest requirements.  
 
While there are massive differences in listing rules, there are much less pronounced 
regulatory and institutional differences between Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. The legal setting 
and securities regulation are very similar in Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. (La Porta et al., 1997, 
1998, 2006). Trading rules relating to market manipulation show slight differences between 
Canada, the U.K. and the U.S., but not in a way that is material for the purpose of understanding 
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differences in fraud (Cumming et al., 2011). There are not pronounced differences in market 
manipulation surveillance across Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. (Cumming and Johan, 2008). 
Moreover, the expenditure on securities law enforcement in terms of the regulators’ budget per 
billion U.S. dollar of GDP is very similar in Canada (US$82,706), the U.K. (US$80,902) and the 
U.S. (US$83,232), and such expenditures are important for litigating fraud and ensuring market 
quality (Jackson and Roe, 2009, Table 2). Therefore, to the extent that there are differences in 
fraud across exchanges in Canada, the U.K. and the U.S., these differences are best accounted for 
in terms of listing standards and not trading rule setting, surveillance and enforcement 
expenditures, technology and/or legal settings. 
 
The standard Becker (1968) formulation shows that the probability of committing fraud is 
a function of the expected payoff and expected penalties from fraud. Expected penalties of fraud 
depend on the magnitude of the penalty and the expected probability of detection. Lower listing 
standards are associated with less transparent companies and as such lower listing standards and 
less transparency likewise are expected to be associated with greater challenges for regulators in 
detecting fraud (Macey and O’Hara, 2002). The lower the listing standards, the lower the 
market-induced penalties for fraud (the market’s reaction to reported cases of fraud);8 this is 
important because market induced penalties are typically more costly than the financial penalties 
imposed by securities commissions (Karpoff et al., 2008a). Therefore, for a given dollar of 
expenditure on enforcement, and for a given probability that firms actually commit fraud, we 
would expect a greater proportion of fraud to be detected on exchanges with higher listing 
standards. But higher transparency not only means it is easier for regulators to detect fraud and 
                                                 
8 Similarly, Rau (2012) shows market valuation effects from bribing are smaller for bribing firms based outside 
North America. 
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prosecute cases, it also means that firms are less likely to commit fraud. With lower listing 
standards, firms are more likely to be able to shroud their fraudulent activities and thereby have 
lower expectations of being caught (Jensen, 2011). We expect this latter effect to dominate if 
firms contemplating fraud take into account the fact that they have a smaller chance of being 
detected in a less transparent market. As between NASDAQ and NYSE, therefore, lower listing 
standards on NASDAQ might be expected to be associated with less transparency and therefore a 
greater incidence of fraud; hence, we expect to more frequently observe cases of litigated fraud 
for NASDAQ companies relative for NYSE companies. Similarly, we expect fraudulent 
activities to be observed more often among the PinkSheets than the NASDAQ and NYSE 
companies. 
 
It is difficult for the SEC to monitor PinkSheet companies, and the SEC acknowledges 
this and even issues warnings on point.9 In this market, the easiest type of fraud to detect often is 
the failure to file requisite reports that are required by a Commission.10 We therefore expect this 
type of fraud to be most commonly observed among Pinksheet companies. 
 
In Canada, there are separate securities commissions in each provincial jurisdiction 
carrying out enforcement, which makes it comparatively more difficult to enforce fraud among 
publicly traded firms in Canada relative to the U.K. and the U.S. Also, the lower Canadian listing 
standards encourage the presence of marginal firms to raise capital, as well as the presence of 
marginal promoters of stock to investors.11  As well, the more complex and costly registration 
process in Canada could make violations more likely.  To this end, lower listing standards are 
                                                 
9 http://www.sec.gov/answers/pink.htm  
10 As described below, only a subset of Pinksheet companies are required to file. 
11 See Johan (2010) and Carpentier et al. (2012).   
17 
 
expected to be associated with a greater propensity of illegal distributions that violate securities 
regulation requirements for a prospectus in Canada relative to the U.K. and U.S. In the U.K., 
raising capital on an exchange requires a Sponsor (for the senior LSE) or a NOMAD (for AIM). 
The formal requirement for this intermediary can be expected to alleviate the likelihood of illegal 
distributions and other types of fraud (Mallin, 2006; Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2010), unlike the 
legal setting in Canada. 
 
 Other factors may bear relevance on the frequency of fraud cases in different countries. 
For instance, Professor John Coffee (Coffee, 2005) argues that corporate governance scandals 
that swept through the U.S. and not Europe shortly after the Internet bubble burst were 
attributable to dispersed ownership in the U.S. and the lack of independence of intermediaries 
such as auditors (see also Erikson et al., 2006, on equity incentives). Another possibility includes 
the cultural forces that account for international differences in the way people behave, including 
those aspects of culture that have been studied by Hofstede.12 In our empirical tests below, 
therefore, we consider not merely differences across countries but also differences across 
exchanges within the same country. While our data do not enable us to completely rule out all 
possible alternative explanations for observed differences across exchanges, they nevertheless 
show extremely pronounced patterns with clear policy implications. 
                                                 
12 Hofstede’s cultural indices available at http://www.geert-hofstede.com/  
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3. Data and Summary Statistics 
 
The data used in this study were recorded from three sources: the CSA in Canada, the 
FSA in the U.K., and the SEC in the U.S. The records of securities cases are maintained in 
different ways in these jurisdictions. In Canada, there is an annual reporting service for all 
securities regulation cases. The reports break information down by the type of case, but do not 
include information on fraud litigation by type of exchange. In the U.K. the FSA publicly 
releases new announcements about new cases and updates to ongoing cases. These FSA news 
announcements however do not include information about which exchange is involved and/or 
breakdowns about the type of case. As well, these news announcements are comingled with other 
type of news announcements that are completely unrelated to fraud or securities litigation. In the 
U.S., the SEC keeps an online searchable database on securities litigation cases, but does not 
provide summary information about the number or types of cases by exchange.13  
 
To assemble the data in a way that was comparable across exchanges, we coded pieces of 
information that were common to each country: the exchange involved, the date in which the 
case was initiated, whether or not there was some form of sanction as at June 2011, and the type 
of case. We recorded information starting in January 2005, primarily because Canadian case 
records prior to that date are not reliably available. Data were collected up to June 2011 for each 
country, the time at which data were collected. The total number of cases assembled amounted to 
4,190 for the three countries over the years considered.  
                                                 
13 A limitation with the dataset (an indeed a limitation with how case information is disclosed in public files) is that 
it is not always possible to ascertain whether or not litigation involving a non-listed company also involved a listed 
company. For example, it is possible a non-listed agent illegally distributed both public and private securities, and 
whether or not public securities are involved (and which exchange) is not always known from case records. 
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 In the data, 73% of the cases were from the SEC in the U.S., 16% from the CSA in 
Canada and 11% from the FSA in the U.K. Among all cases across the exchanges and all years 
the following became evident: 6.9% involved a known NYSE company; 20.7% involved a 
known NASDAQ company; 44.8% involved a known PinkSheet company; 1% involved a 
known LSE company; 0.2% involved an AIM company; 0.8% involved a TSX company; 0.4% 
involved a TSXV company; 1% involved a company listed on another exchange;14 and 25.1% of 
the cases involved a private (non-listed) company.  
 
Private companies in the U.S. subsample are captured in the dataset if they carried out a 
fraud that involved an unknown public (listed) company; that is, the specific public company or 
companies involved is not known from the case file. Private companies are captured in the U.K. 
and Canadian data if they carried out a fraud that involved either a public or private company 
which is likewise of an unknown identity; it was not possible to isolate public from private 
companies in the unknown U.K. and Canadian data. 
 
 Across Canada, the U.K. and the U.S., the year distribution shows 13.0% of fraud actions 
were initiated in 2005, 9.7% in 2006, 14.8% in 2007, 15.7% in 2008, 16.7% in 2009, 20.8% in 
2010, and 9.3% in the first half of 2011. This pattern is consistent with the idea that securities 
commissions are under political pressure to take on more fraud actions in times of weaker market 
conditions.15 Figure 1 shows a similar pattern by year across each jurisdiction. 
                                                 
14 A small number of cross listings are present in the data. These cross listings are immaterial in our empirics. 
15 There are a couple of alternative explanations for these patterns. First, as the economy sours, companies on the 
edge are more likely to cut corners to try to survive, thus finding themselves in breach of various laws and 
regulations. Second, these companies may have been engaged in some type of irregularity or illegality all 
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Figure 1. Yearly Distribution of Cases by Jurisdiction 
 
This figure presents the percentage of securities fraud cases in the data by jurisdiction: SEC in the U.S., CSA in 
Canada, and FSA in the U.K. Percentages are reported relative to the total number of cases on each exchange over 
the entire period comprising cases initiated between January 2005 and June 2011, as summarized in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 The most common type of violation among the entire period and for all countries is 
delinquency to file the required materials with the commission (28.5%), followed by non-
financial fraudulent misrepresentation and disclosure (18.1%); illegal distribution (17.6%); 
financial fraud (13.8%); insider trading (11.5%); pump and dump (5.2%); other forms of 
manipulative trading such as wash trades, matched trades, and marking the close (4.7%); and last 
but not least, bribery (0.7%). A majority of cases (60%) were resolved with some form of 
                                                                                                                                                             
throughout, but because of the strength of the economy or because of their own performance they were not 
discovered until the economy soured. 
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sanction (as at June 2011). For ease of comparability, because sanctions differ across 
jurisdictions depending on severity and type, we simply track whether or not there has been a 
sanction. This allows us to examine whether or not the subsample of sanctions provides results 
that are comparable to the full sample in our regression analyses in the next section. 
 
Table 1 breaks down types of violation cases (defined above) by exchange in Panel A and 
provides comparison tests in Panel B. Table 1 indicates both the number of cases and number of 
listed companies. All types of fraud litigation cases per year involving NYSE companies on 
average represent 1.9% (=12.12%/6.5 years) of NYSE listings, but 4.5% of NASDAQ listings 
and 5.1% of the much larger number of PinkSheet listings. By contrast, all types of fraud cases 
involving TSX companies represent on average 0.3% of TSX listings and only 0.1% of TSXV 
listings. Similarly, all types fraud cases involving LSE companies represent 0.4% of LSE listings 
and 0.1% of AIM listings. A large proportion of litigated frauds in Canada and the U.K. involve 
private companies; these cases sum to 2.2% of the total number of listed companies in Canada 
per year and 2.0% of the total number of listed companies in the U.K. per year. 
 
Table 1 shows that in the U.S., all types of fraud are consistently more common on 
NASDAQ than NYSE (with the sole exception of bribery, where there is a trivially higher 
frequency of bribery among NASDAQ than NYSE companies).  In the U.S., financial fraud, 
insider trading and improper trading is more often litigated (relative to the number of listed 
companies) on NASDAQ than NYSE and the PinkSheets (which is likely due to the fact that 
class-action attorneys are more focused on these issues for NASDAQ and NYSE companies than 
PinkSheet companies); fraud involving illegal distributions and delinquencies in filing periodic 
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reports with the Commission are most common among the PinkSheets. In short, the lower listing 
standards on NASDAQ relative to NYSE are associated with higher levels of financial fraud, 
insider trading and trading based market manipulation. Likewise, the lower listing standards on 
the PinkSheets are associated with a higher incidence of illegal distributions and improper and 
incomplete reporting to the SEC. 
 
Similar to the experience of PinkSheets in the U.S., Table 1 shows there are a pronounced 
number of cases involving non-listed companies carrying out illegal distributions in Canada. 
Litigation involving illegal distributions is less common in the U.K. than Canada, which may be 
explained by the role of the nominated advisors (NOMAD) in the U.K., particularly in the 
NOMAD’s role for obtaining an AIM listing, as discussed above.16 
 
Table 1 clearly highlights the importance of fraud to investors.  Perhaps most notably, 
financial fraud comprises 7.79% of NASDAQ listings and 2.01% of NYSE companies.  
Financial fraud cases involve penalties (from the SEC as well as loss in shareholder value due to 
reputation and other things) that on average amount to 41% of a stock’s value (Karpoff et al., 
2008b).  The differences in the frequency of fraud across NYSE and NASDAQ there imply an 
expected cost of 3.2% of the value of a NASDAQ listing and 0.8% of the value of a NYSE 
listing.  Given the absence of reporting of differences in fraud across exchanges, it is unclear 
whether or not investors take this into account for their investment and/or pricing decisions. 
                                                 
16 See also Financial Services Authority (2002). There is some anecdotal evidence of improper conduct among 
NOMADs, but no such evidence in the FSA case records of NOMAD misconduct. 
Table 1. Summary Statistics and Comparison of Proportions Tests 
 
This table presents the number of listed firms on the NYSE, NASDAQ, Pink Sheets (including OTC and grey market stocks), TSX, TSXV, LSE and AIM, as well as the number of litigated securities cases in 
each jurisdiction for the eight different types of fraud. “Private” cases in the U.S. comprise private companies for which a fraud was carried out by a private company against an unidentified listed public 
company. “Private” in Canada and the U.K. comprise all private company cases where fraud was carried out by a private company against an unidentified publicly listed company or a private company. The data 
cover the years January 2005 to June 2011. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Summary Statistics 
  
Average 
Number 
Listed 
Firms 
Total Cases 
January 2005 - 
June 2011 
Financial 
Fraud 
Other Fraudulent 
Misrepresentation 
and disclosure 
Illegal 
Distribution Bribery 
Pump and 
Dump 
Wash / 
Matched / 
Improper Trade 
/ Marking the 
Close 
Insider Trading 
Delinquent in 
its periodic 
filings with the 
Commission 
    # % # % # % # % # % # % # % # % # % 
(1) NYSE 2392 290 12.12% 48 2.01% 31 1.30% 34 1.42% 15 0.63% 12 0.50% 47 1.96% 98 4.10% 5 0.21% 
(2) NASDAQ 2953 867 29.36% 230 7.79% 142 4.81% 47 1.59% 13 0.44% 31 1.05% 82 2.78% 301 10.19% 21 0.71% 
(3) Pink Sheets 5667 1880 33.17% 159 2.81% 212 3.74% 178 3.14% 0 0.00% 151 2.66% 20 0.35% 12 0.21% 1148 20.26% 
(4) TSX 1560 33 2.12% 6 0.38% 23 1.47% 3 0.19% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 0.06% 0 0.00% 
(5) TSXV 2333 15 0.64% 4 0.17% 2 0.09% 9 0.39% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
(6) LSE 1549 40 2.58% 4 0.26% 11 0.71% 6 0.39% 0 0.00% 4 0.26% 5 0.32% 8 0.52% 2 0.13% 
(7) AIM 1452 9 0.62% 0 0.00% 1 0.07% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 0.07% 7 0.48% 0 0.00% 
(8) Private - US 5345 95 1.78% 19 0.36% 36 0.67% 18 0.34% 0 0.00% 7 0.13% 7 0.13% 6 0.11% 2 0.04% 
(9) Private - Can 3893 567 14.56% 28 0.72% 136 3.49% 379 9.74% 0 0.00% 1 0.03% 19 0.49% 4 0.10% 0 0.00% 
(10) Private - UK 3001 390 13.00% 86 2.87% 138 4.60% 85 2.83% 0 0.00% 7 0.23% 17 0.57% 39 1.30% 18 0.60% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Comparison of Proportions Tests  
 
Total Cases 
January 2005 - 
June 2011 
Financial 
Fraud 
Other Fraudulent 
Misrepresentation 
and disclosure 
Illegal 
Distribution Bribery 
Pump and 
Dump 
Wash / 
Matched / 
Improper Trade 
/ Marking the 
Close 
Insider Trading 
Delinquent in 
its periodic 
filings with the 
Commission 
(1) versus '(2) p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.613 p <= 0.347 p <= 0.027** p <= 0.054* p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.000*** 
(1) versus '(3) p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.902 p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.000*** 
(4) versus '(5) p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.198 p <= 0.000***  <= 0.286 p <= 1.000 p <= 1.000 p <= 1.000 p <= 0.221 p <= 1.000 
(6) versus '(7) p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.030** p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.053* p <= 0.120 p <= 0.894 p <= 0.171 
All US versus All Canada p <=0.000*** p <=0.000*** p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.000*** 
All US versus All UK p <=0.000*** p <=0.000*** p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.000*** 
All Canada versus All 
UK p <=0.000*** p <=0.000*** p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.000*** Not Applicable p <=0.000*** p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.000*** p <= 0.000*** 
4. Regression Analyses 
 This section provides more formal tests with regression analyses to ascertain, in a 
multivariate setting, whether the total number of fraud cases and the total number of different 
types of fraud cases are more likely to be observed on different exchanges. We run a series of 
regressions to predict the frequency of fraud litigation as a function of listing standards, 
securities commission/country enforcement effects, and exchange effects and timing. For listing 
standards we use minimum capitalization as required by the exchange, and a dummy variable for 
the NOMAD requirement on AIM.  For securities commission/country enforcement effects we 
include dummy variables for the CSA and FSA and exclude a dummy for the SEC to avoid 
perfect collinearity.  For market effects we include variables for the number of listed companies 
on the exchange/year, the average size (market capitalization) of the firms on the exchange in 
each year, the average market/book value of the firms on the exchange in each year, and the 
index return in the prior year prior.   
 
 To test the proposition that fraud differs across exchanges due to the characteristics of the 
exchange and not only market conditions and/or characteristics of companies listed on the 
exchange, we transformed the firm-level data of 4,190 fraud cases into an exchange-year pooled 
dataset of 49 observations comprised of 7 exchanges (NYSE, NASAQ, PinkSheets, TSX, TSXV, 
LSE, and AIM) and 7 years (2005-2011).  We report the summary statistics (means, medians, 
standard deviation, minimum and maximum values) from the pooled dataset in Table 2.   
 
Table 2 shows that for an average exchange-year, there are 64 cases in total, of which 9 
involve financial disclosures, 9 are non-financial fraudulent disclosure, 6 involve illegal 
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distributions, 1 involves bribery, 4 involve pump and dump schemes, 3 involve wash trades, 9 
involve insider trading, and 24 involve delinquent filings.  The average market/book on an 
exchange-year is 19.106, which is quite large as a result of the PinkSheet listings.  The average 
index return over the years is 4%.  
 
One of the main variables of interest is the proxy for listing standards.  We use the 
minimum float requirements for that purpose. Unlike Canada and the U.S., we note that 
minimum float is not uniquely defined on the LSE, as discussed above, so we proxy minimum 
float by minimum capitalization; adjustments to this proxy based on the 25% float requirement 
discussed above did not significantly influence our findings discussed below.  Also, we note that 
on some exchanges there are multiple tiers of listing, such as the LSE as discussed above.  We 
are unable to treat different tiers in our pooled dataset as distinct markets since there does not 
exist market statistics for the listed companies within each tier (market capitalization and/or 
other trading data are not reported by tier, and likewise firm-specific data such as numbers of 
listed companies in a tier and/or market/book ratios etc. are not reported by tier).  Nevertheless, 
the distinctions within different tiers on an exchange are very small compared to the differences 
across exchanges, and our proxy for listing standards by minimum float is not materially 
different by tiers.  The average minimum float is US$18.017 million, and the standard deviation 
is US$34.467 million. 
 
We show the regression results in Table 3 for all cases in Panel A, the subset of cases 
with sanctions in Panel B, and the subset of cases from NYSE, NASDAQ, and the PinkSheets in 
Panel C.  All of the regressions are estimated with 2-way clustering of standard errors by country 
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and time (Petersen, 2009).  The use of clustered standard errors lowers the statistical significance 
of some of the estimates relative to not clustering.   
 
 Table 3 Panel A shows that minimum capitalization listing standards significantly 
impacts the frequency of total fraud, and this effect is significant at the 5% level.  In particular, 
an increase in listing standards by 1-standard deviation (18.017 million) is associated with 17.56 
fewer cases per month.  Given the median number of cases per exchange-year is 64, this 
represents a drop by 27.4% relative to the average.  In other words, the effect is economically 
significant.  In the subsample of cases with sanctions (Panel B), the effect is slightly larger at 
16.68 fewer cased per month for a 1-standard deviation drop.  But given there are only an 
average of 36.5 cases per month, this represents a percentage drop by 45.8% relative to the 
average.  Finally, in the subsample of U.S. cases from NYSE, NASDAQ, and the PinkSheets in 
Panel C, the drop in the total number of cases for a 1-standard deviation change in listing 
standards is 20.3 cases, or 14% of the 144.7 cases per month in the U.S.  Overall, the data are 
therefore consistent with the notion that higher listing standards on an exchange are associated 
with fewer incidences of fraud, and this effect is statistically and economically significant, and 
robust to different subsets of the data. 
 
 Regarding the different types of fraud, higher minimum capitalization is associated with 
less frequent financial fraud in each of Panels A, B, and C, and this effect is statistically 
significant at the 1% level in Panels A and B, and at the 10% level in Panel C.  The economic 
significance is such that a 1-standard deviation increase in minimum capitalization is associated 
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with a reduction in financial fraud by 6.1 cases per month, which is a reduction of 66% relative 
to the average number (9.2) of financial fraud cases in each exchange-month.   
 
Higher minimum capitalization is likewise associated with less frequent pump and dump 
cases and fewer delinquencies in filing with the Commission in Panel B for the subsample of 
cases involving sanctions, and these effects are significant at the 10% and 5% levels, 
respectively.  The economic significance is such that a 1-standard deviation increase in minimum 
capitalization is associated with a reduction by 4.4 pump and dump cases (which is 35.5% 
relative to the average exchange-year) and a reduction by 12.7 delinquent filings cases (which is 
a reduction by 52.8% relative to the average exchange-year). 
 
Note that each of the Panels A, B, and C show higher minimum capitalization is 
associated with higher levels of bribery.  Recall from Table 1 that only the NYSE firms were 
discovered bribing foreign officials, and hence we may infer that this effect is related to the fact 
higher listing standards mitigate the presence of smaller domestic-only companies without an 
interest bribing foreign officials. The economic significance is large as well: a 1-standard 
deviation reduction in minimum capitalization reduces the probability of bribery by 1.26 cases 
per exchange-month, which is 220% of the average number (0.571) of bribery cases per 
exchange-month. 
 
Unlike minimum capitalization, the NOMAD listing requirement shows very little 
evidence of being associated with fraud.  The only evidence comes from the bribery cases in 
Panel A, but this effect is not robust in the subsample of sanctioned cases in Panel B.  Moreover, 
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there is evidence of more frequent delinquent filings with the commission cases in both Panels A 
and B.  Overall, therefore, the data appear to be most consistent with the view that NOMAD 
requirements do very little, if anything, to mitigate fraud. 
 
The country variables in Table 3 show the Canadian Securities Administrator (CSA) and 
the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the U.K. are less effective than the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) in the U.S. in detecting and litigating fraud.  On average, the CSA 
and FSA respectively initiate 86 and 82 fewer cases, and have 101 and 103 fewer sanctioned 
cases.  Put differently, in any given year the SEC initiates more than 130% of cases than does the 
CSA or FSA, and has over 280% more sanctions than does the CSA or FSA. These differences 
are significant at the 1% level for the FSA for both initiated cases and sanctions, and at the 1% 
level for initiated cases and at the 5% level for sanctions for the CSA. Similarly pronounced 
differences in terms of both economic and statistical significance exist in the data between the 
CSA and FSA vis-à-vis the SEC for all the specific types of fraud, with the exception of illegal 
distributions, pump-and-dump schemes, and delinquent filings. 
 
The control variables in Table 3 are for the most part significant in ways one would 
expect. First, when there are more companies listed in each exchange-year, there are a 
significantly greater total number of fraud cases, as well as more illegal distributions, pump and 
dump cases, and cases involving delinquent filings, as expected. More listed companies are 
associated with fewer bribery cases (which could reflect stronger market conditions and less of a 
need to bribe) and fewer insider trading cases (which could reflect a lower proportion of insiders 
with more companies, or less proprietary knowledge among insiders).   
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Second, the data indicate that the average size of companies is rather unrelated to fraud.  
It is noteworthy that average firm size is unrelated to fraud, while minimum size requirements in 
terms of capitalization are related to fraud, as indicated above.  The absence of an average size 
firm effect taken together with a significant minimum capitalization effect suggests the role of 
listing standards is to keep the left-tail of the distribution out of the population and thereby 
reduce the likelihood of fraud.   
 
Third, we control for industry effects by using the average market/book ratio in each 
exchange-year. High market/book values are associated with high-tech companies and those with 
relatively more intangible assets, and companies with significant with growth options and hence 
more pronounced agency problems. The data indicate market/book values are associated with 
more total fraud in Panel A and C, although this effect is insignificant for total sanctions in Panel 
B.  There some differences in the effect of market/book values on fraud in the subsamples.  In 
the full sample in Panel A and in the sample of sanctioned cases in Panel B, market/book is 
positively associated with more fraudulent misrepresentation and disclosure. In Panel C, 
market/book is positively associated with bribery and delinquent filings.  In the subsample of 
sanctioned cases, market/book is negatively associated with financial fraud and delinquent 
filings.  We do not have strong explanations for these latter two results, except the possibility 
that sanctions are harder to secure for certain types of cases in industries with relatively more 
intangible assets. 
 
Table 2. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
 
This table defines the variables used in the regressions in Table 3 and provides summary statistics. The sample covers 4,190 cases initiated by securities commissions in Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. over 
the period January 2005 to June 2011. The panel comprises 49 observations for 7 exchanges (NYSE, NASDAQ, PinkSheets, TSX, TSXV, LSE, and AIM) and 7 years (2005-2011).  The Canadian data are 
derived from http://www.securities-administrators.ca/. The U.K. data are derived from http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/library/index.shtml. The SEC data are derived from 
http://search.sec.gov/secgov/index.jsp#queryResultsTop. 
 
Variable Definition Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Total Fraud The total number of fraud cases in each exchange-year. 63.959 8 99.647 0 379 
Financial Fraud The total number of financial fraud cases in each exchange-year. 9.204 1 13.299 0 53 
Non-Financial Fraudulent 
Disclosure The total number of non-financial disclosure fraud cases in each exchange-year. 8.612 2 17.184 0 81 
Illegal Distribution The total number of illegal distribution cases in each exchange-year. 5.653 1 10.505 0 44 
Bribery The total number of bribery cases in each exchange-year. 0.571 0 1.275 0 7 
Pump and Dump The total number of pump-and-dump cases in each exchange-year. 4.041 0 7.903 0 25 
Wash / Matched / 
Improper Trade / 
Marking the Close 
The total number of wash trade, improper trade, and marking the close fraud cases in each exchange-
year. 3.163 0 11.033 0 69 
Insider Trading The total number of insider trading cases in each exchange-year. 8.714 1 17.865 0 94 
Delinquent Filings with 
the Commission The total number of delinquent filing cases in each exchange-year. 24.000 0 64.954 0 286 
Minimum Float The minimum float required on the exchange (proxied by minimum capitalization for the LSE). 18.017 1.12 34.467 0 100 
NOMAD A dummy variable equal to 1 for AIM listings to account for the NOMAD requirement. 0.143 0 0.354 0 1 
CSA A dummy variable equal to 1 for CSA cases. 0.265 0 0.446 0 1 
FSA A dummy variable equal to 1 for FSA cases. 0.286 0 0.456 0 1 
Number of Listed 
Companies The total number of listed companies each exchange-year. 2,543.816 2,270 1368.534 1,194 6,135 
Average Size of Listed 
Companies The average market capitalization of the companies in each exchange-year in millions of USD. 1469.739 1064.273 1962.887 1.547 6813.597 
Average Market / Book 
of Listed Companies The average market / book value of listed companies in each exchange year. 19.106 4.489 52.439 1.726 254.505 
Index Return The market-specific index return in each exchange-year. 0.039 0.85 0.187 -0.386 0.297 
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Table 3. Regression Analyses 
 
This table presents two-way clustered regressions (by exchange and time) of the frequency of different types of fraud by year and exchange (7 years, 7 exchanges) as function of listing standards, commission / 
enforcement / country effects, and market effects. Among the country effects a dummy variable is excluded for the U.S. so that the probabilities are relative to the U.S. Panel A presents the full sample.  Panel B 
presents the subsample of cases with sanctions only.  Panel C presents the subsample from NYSE, NASDAQ, and PinkSheets only.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Full Sample 
  Total Fraud Financial Fraud 
Fraudulent 
Misrepresentation 
and disclosure 
Illegal Distribution Bribery Pump and Dump 
Wash / Matched / 
Improper Trade / 
Marking the Close 
Insider Trading 
Delinquent in its 
periodic filings with 
the Commission 
  Coefficient t-statistic 
Coeffici
ent 
t-
statistic 
Coeffici
ent 
t-
statistic 
Coeffici
ent 
t-
statistic 
Coeffi
cient 
t-
statistic 
Coeffi
cient 
t-
statistic 
Coeffici
ent 
t-
statisti
c 
Coeffici
ent 
t-
statistic 
Coeffici
ent t-statistic 
Listing Standards 
Minimum 
Capitalization -0.975 -2.24** -0.177 -3.56*** -0.231 -1.41 0.045 0.46 0.037 4.73*** -0.077 -1.45 -0.052 -0.72 -0.145 -0.64 -0.374 -1.31 
NOMAD 12.054 0.63 -2.414 -0.47 0.241 0.06 -0.831 -0.19 -1.136 -2.06** 2.759 1.62 0.534 0.06 -6.483 -0.59 19.383 1.70* 
Commission / 
Country Enforcement 
Effects                   
CSA -85.896 -4.24*** -29.409 -1.72* -20.583 -2.01** 1.728 0.36 -1.725 -2.19** 0.584 0.42 -9.743 -1.81* -48.516 -5.31*** 21.767 1.07 
FSA -82.050 -3.32*** -28.935 -1.80* -22.807 -1.85* 5.271 0.96 -1.012 -1.80* 1.039 0.48 -10.279 -1.47 -48.442 -4.11*** 23.115 1.15 
Market Effects 
Number of Listed 
Companies 0.032 3.84*** -0.001 -0.19 -0.0004 -0.39 0.007 3.13*** -0.001 -1.74* 0.006 6.79*** -0.001 -0.37 -0.012 -3.28*** 0.035 4.09*** 
Average Size of 
Listed Companies 0.007 0.73 -0.001 -0.33 0.001 0.54 0.000 -0.15 -0.001 -2.10** 0.001 1.56 0.001 1.53 -0.002 -0.60 0.008 1.61 
Average 
Market/Book of 
Listed Companies 
0.604 53.99*** -0.020 -0.64 0.073 1.75* -0.006 -0.23 0.001 0.27 0.015 1.33 -0.027 -1.45 -0.004 -0.07 0.573 8.95*** 
Index Return 31.007 1.49 5.572 1.86* -0.057 0 7.532 0.85 0.593 1.54 -0.011 -0.01 0.299 0.09 3.124 0.27 13.956 0.67 
Constant 20.221 0.82 32.916 1.10 22.964 1.78* -15.260 -1.78* 2.921 2.00** -12.196 -3.61*** 10.960 1.39 73.994 4.85** -96.078 -2.77*** 
# Observations 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Adj R2 0.919 0.708 0.391 0.689 0.496 0.875 0.114 0.400 0.891 
 
Panel B. Subsample of Cases with Sanctions 
  Total Fraud Financial Fraud 
Fraudulent 
Misrepresentation 
and disclosure 
Illegal Distribution Bribery Pump and Dump 
Wash / Matched / 
Improper Trade / 
Marking the Close 
Insider Trading 
Delinquent in its 
periodic filings with 
the Commission 
  Coefficient t-statistic 
Coeffici
ent 
t-
statistic 
Coeffici
ent 
t-
statistic 
Coeffici
ent 
t-
statistic 
Coeffi
cient 
t-
statistic 
Coeffi
cient 
t-
statistic 
Coeffici
ent 
t-
statisti
c 
Coeffici
ent 
t-
statistic 
Coeffici
ent t-statistic 
Listing Standards 
Minimum 
Capitalization -0.926 -2.83*** -0.186 -4.14*** -0.225 -1.57 0.087 1.02 0.019 4.29*** -0.045 -1.73* -0.045 -0.65 -0.163 -0.71 -0.368 -2.10** 
NOMAD 4.406 0.35 -2.318 -0.5 -0.835 -0.33 -4.242 -0.98 -0.687 -1.57 0.536 0.46 0.366 0.46 -3.610 -0.48 15.196 2.40** 
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Table 3 Panel B 
(Continued) Total Fraud Financial Fraud 
Fraudulent 
Misrepresentation 
and disclosure 
Illegal Distribution Bribery Pump and Dump 
Wash / Matched / 
Improper Trade / 
Marking the Close 
Insider Trading 
Delinquent in its 
periodic filings with 
the Commission 
  Coefficient t-statistic 
Coeffici
ent 
t-
statistic 
Coeffici
ent 
t-
statistic 
Coeffici
ent 
t-
statistic 
Coeffi
cient 
t-
statistic 
Coeffi
cient 
t-
statistic 
Coeffici
ent 
t-
statisti
c 
Coeffici
ent 
t-
statistic 
Coeffici
ent t-statistic 
Commission / 
Country Enforcement 
Effects                   
CSA -100.946 -2.54** -28.698 -1.78* -23.359 -1.89* -4.582 -1.48 -1.678 -2.04** -2.806 -1.54 -8.667 -2.03** -40.220 -2.50** 9.064 0.86 
FSA -103.290 -2.59*** -28.558 -1.91* -25.484 -1.85* -0.285 -0.06 -1.309 -2.24** -2.625 -1.52 -9.251 -1.61 -40.958 -2.38** 5.180 0.50 
Market Effects 
Number of Listed 
Companies 0.004 0.4 -0.003 -0.46 -0.004 -1.39 0.001 0.89 
-
0.0005 -1.56 0.001 1.64 -0.001 -0.95 -0.010 -1.92* 0.020 5.32*** 
Average Size of 
Listed Companies 0.004 0.72 -0.001 -0.31 0.001 0.61 -0.002 -0.83 
-
0.0003 -1.57 0.001 0.83 0.001 0.94 -0.001 -0.34 0.007 2.50** 
Average 
Market/Book of 
Listed Companies 
-0.129 -1.37 -0.052 -1.69* 0.070 1.82* 0.002 0.08 0.000 0.09 -0.012 -1.15 -0.013 -0.74 0.0004 0.01 -0.123 -1.83* 
Index Return 22.820 0.79 7.894 1.36 0.876 0.07 11.349 1.19 0.596 1.71* -0.058 -0.02 0.886 0.35 11.301 2.63*** -10.023 -1.52 
Constant 93.989 1.58 34.537 1.27 31.467 1.83* 2.608 0.52 2.674 1.86* 0.318 0.09 10.779 2.11** 60.031 2.57** -48.425 -3.10*** 
# Observations 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Adj R2 0.698 0.619 0.283 0.235 0.490 0.355 0.112 0.452 0.726 
 
Panel C. Subsample from NYSE, NASDAQ, and PinkSheets 
 Total Fraud Financial Fraud 
Fraudulent 
Misrepresentation 
and disclosure 
Illegal Distribution Bribery Pump and Dump 
Wash / Matched / 
Improper Trade / 
Marking the Close 
Insider Trading 
Delinquent in its 
periodic filings with 
the Commission 
  Coefficient t-statistic 
Coeffici
ent 
t-
statistic 
Coeffici
ent 
t-
statistic 
Coeffici
ent 
t-
statistic 
Coeffi
cient 
t-
statistic 
Coeffi
cient 
t-
statistic 
Coeffici
ent 
t-
statisti
c 
Coeffici
ent 
t-
statistic 
Coeffici
ent t-statistic 
Listing Standards 
Minimum 
Capitalization -0.458 -2.16** -0.173 -1.75* -0.263 -0.840 0.206 1.150 0.044 4.25*** -0.018 -0.290 -0.102 -0.870 -0.326 -0.620 0.174 0.590 
Market Effects 
Number of Listed 
Companies 0.017 2.60*** -0.01 -2.71*** -0.004 -0.31 0.007 2.42*** -0.001 -4.75*** 0.006 0.57 -0.002 
-
3.86**
* 
-0.021 -0.92 0.03833 3.70*** 
Average Size of 
Listed Companies -0.009 -1.82* 0.00 -1.97** -0.0001 -0.01 -0.003 -0.84 
-
0.0008 -3.17*** 0.000 0.38 0.001 0.17 -0.003 -0.38 0.0004 0.04 
Average 
Market/Book of 
Listed Companies 
0.697 9.08*** 0.01 0.56 0.083 1.22 0.002 0.07 0.003 1.92* 0.012 1.00 -0.021 -1.27 0.041 0.55 0.568 7.45*** 
Index Return 87.612 5.32*** 11.18 0.12 -3.993 -0.10 23.201 1.03 1.374 1.60 1.492 0.19 -1.972 -0.19 0.988 0.04 55.340 0.98 
Constant 91.156 3.48*** 57.85 5.49*** 38.780 3.20*** -15.055 -1.40 4.512 4.96*** -13.577 -3.41*** 18.529 2.31** 114.970 4.98*** -114.853 -2.76*** 
# Observations 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Adj R2 0.910 0.657 0.257 0.632 0.396 0.846 0.042 0.549 0.888 
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5. Additional Robustness Checks, Extensions and Future Research 
 
We considered a number of other robustness checks that are not reported in Table 3.  
First, we consider other regression methods including but not limited to Poisson regressions.  
Poisson regressions account for the fact that in the data most exchange-years do not have many 
cases, and only in a few exchange-years there are a significantly larger number of case (i.e., the 
distribution of the dependent variable closely resembles a Poisson distribution). In those 
regressions we found quite similar effects in terms of economic significance, but often had 
greater statistical significance with the estimates. But because double-clustering of standard 
errors is not feasible with Poisson regressions, we decided to report the results as seen in Table 3.   
 
Second, we considered other explanatory variables such as different alternatives for 
market conditions and exchange effects but the results were not materially impacted. The only 
regressions where findings significantly changed were those in which new variables introduced 
severe collinearity problems.  In our estimates we are unable to incorporate fixed effects across 
exchanges since some of the variables are time invariant in the pooled sample.   
 
Third, we considered dropping some years, such as 2011 where we have only half the 
year represented.  As well, we considered combining the U.S. subsample in Table 3 Panel C with 
Canada only, or the U.K. only.  In each case, the findings were not materially different.   
 
Fourth, we considered firm-level regressions (unlike the pooled exchange-year level 
regressions reported in Table 3) in an earlier version of this paper to ascertain the likelihood of 
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different types of fraud across exchanges.  In those regressions we inferred from the data that 
differences across exchanges do in fact give rise to differences in fraud propensities.  This 
general inference is consistent with that from Table 3: fraud is observed with different frequency 
on different exchanges.  Therefore, it naturally follows that market participants, especially 
investors, should have access to this information through exchanges and their regulators posting 
statistics on fraud on an exchange-by-exchange basis.  This implication from the data is 
discussed further below. 
 
The most significant limitation of our empirical analysis is that we do not observe 
changes in listing standards over time in our sample.  Further research could explore such 
changes if and when they occur in the future.  Nevertheless, we note that the differences in 
means and medians in fraud across the exchanges we observe is extremely large (Table 1) and 
robust to controls for time, market conditions, firm characteristics such as size and market / book 
value, etc. (Table 3).  As we have mentioned, while there are massive differences in listing rules, 
there are much less pronounced regulatory and institutional differences between Canada, the 
U.K. and the U.S. in terms of legal origin and securities regulation (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 
2006)., exchange trading rules (Cumming et al., 2011), surveillance (Cumming and Johan, 
2008), and enforcement expenditures (Jackson and Roe, 2009). Therefore, we believe the 
evidence is strongly consistent with the view that the differences in fraud across exchanges in 
Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. are best accounted for in terms of listing standards and the 
accompanying quality of enforcement settings in the different countries. 
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Three additional areas could be explored in future research.  First, when comparing 
enforcement across regimes, the underlying legal framework may be the cause of some of the 
discrepancies.  Future research could examine the extent to which differences in private rights 
give rise to differences in public enforcement from public organizations such as the SEC.  
Though agency funding across the SEC, FSA and CSA is relatively the same, the significantly 
higher amount of U.S. private litigation may alert the SEC to investigate certain types of fraud.  
That is, there may be complementarities between private and public enforcement.   
 
 Second, if we are correct in inferring that characteristics of different exchanges lead to 
different enforcement outcomes, it would be useful to obtain data on agencies’ budget figures to 
see how agencies apportion their enforcement budget across the various exchanges.  We were 
unable to obtain such data for this project, but such data may become available in the future. 
 
Third, future work could consider cultural differences across countries in the spirit of 
Hofstede’s work (http://geert-hofstede.com/).  There are small differences in corruption across 
Canada, the U.K. and the U.S., but we were unable to tie these differences to the fraud outcomes 
observed.  By considering other countries, there may be further insights (although see the next 
section below).  As a related matter, it is possible that that different media exposure across 
countries also impacts enforcement.  That is, it may be that across the regimes some countries 
have a stronger "business morality" for which there is a reputational loss related to fines for 
wrongdoing that the purely financial penalties do not capture. Karpoff et al. (2008a,b) have 
carried out work in the U.S., but we are unaware of similar work in the other countries. 
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6. Insights from Other Jurisdictions 
 
In this section we briefly compare reported cases of securities fraud in Brazil, China and 
Germany. These countries are civil law jurisdictions that represent an interesting comparison 
between fast-developing nations and well-established industrialized nations. 
 
Financial fraud is rarely litigated in Brazil. Despite recent corporate governance reforms 
in Brazil (“Novo Mercado” in 2005), Brazil only handed down the first-ever insider trading case 
ruling in the country in February 2011 (Hoffman, 2011). The case involved insider trading 
associated with the purchase of a food maker, and two executives were sentenced to community 
service in lieu of a prison term and fines of approximately US$200,000. The executives that were 
sentenced included the former CFO and a former board member of Sadia SA, whereby the 
acquisition in question enabled Sadia to form the world’s largest poultry exporter. The 
executives had purchased American depositary receipts before the hostile bid to buy their rival in 
2006. In addition, the authors of this report and their assistants contacted the CVM (Brazilian 
Securities Commission) in June 2011 about other cases involving securities fraud in Brazil and 
failed to get a response after two months. The English version of the CVM webpage appears to 
be much lighter than the Portuguese version (Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil, 
2011). Moreover, other sources indicate that “[t]he CVM’s recommendations on corporate 
governance are not mandatory, and non-compliance is not subject to punishment. Firms that are 
at least six months late in filing their annual reports are only placed on a list that is published on 
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the CVM’s website."17 Suffice it to say, enforcement of securities regulation in Brazil is not 
frequent, exacting or severe. Hence fraud is so rarely observed in Brazil that investor confidence 
is likewise expected to be at a very low level relative to other markets.  
 
 China offers an interesting comparison to Brazil as competing developing nations, both 
already major players in terms of global presence. Like CVM in Brazil, the Chinese Securities 
and Regulatory Commission (CSRC) revised its securities laws in 2005. The CSRC reforms 
were based in part on an international consultation with best practices in other developed 
countries. Empirical work on corporate fraud in China (Hou and Moore, 2010) shows plenty of 
litigated cases, representing on average 3.8% of listed companies per year. Importantly, we note 
that there are no material differences in listing standards between the Shanghai and Shenzen 
stock exchanges and likewise there are no material differences in fraud across these two 
exchanges (Hou and Moore, 2010). At the same time, however, there are significant differences 
in the detection of fraud and consequences of detecting fraud in terms of market reaction 
depending on whether or not the company involved has a political connection to the state 
(Cumming, et al., 2011). 
 
While fraud is commonly detected in some developing countries like China, fraud is 
rarely detected in other developed countries. One notable example is Germany. The junior Neur 
Markt exchange appears to have had merely 4 confirmed cases of fraud (Peemöller and 
Hofmann, 2005) and 25 documented rumors of suspected fraud (Burghof and Hunger, 2003) in 
its entire history. Coupled with the burst of the DotCom bubble, a lack of confidence among 
                                                 
17See the Economist Intelligence Unit available at 
http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=ib3Article&article_id=827089267&country_id=1480000148&pubtypeid=113
2462498&industry_id=640001064&category_id=&rf=0 
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market participants in the regulators ability to detect and prosecute fraud led to the demise of the 
Neur Markt at the end of 2002. In conversations with academics in Germany in 2011, we learned 
that the regulatory body in Germany appears to have some information on insider trading on the 
Neur Markt, but are very reluctant to give it away even to academics in Germany. There is no 
news service or other form of record keeping on fraud and insider trading from the Neur Markt 
other than that which has been documented by academic studies (Burghof and Hunger, 2003; 
Peemöller and Hofmann, 2005).  
 
7. Policy Implications and Recommendations 
 
Exchange listing standards provide to market participants a signal of the quality of the 
exchange and the nature of the companies trading on the exchange. Higher listing standards 
attract more mature companies for which information problems are less pronounced. Exchanges 
themselves act as a mechanism to signal quality in terms of screening out lower-quality listings. 
The first-line governance provided by the exchange signals to investors the potential rigor 
required for appropriate due diligence of issues related to potential fraud. Also, it potentially 
mitigates the need for time-constrained or less-sophisticated individual investors to carry out 
their own thorough due diligence of the corporate governance structures for every potential 
investment. Certification provided by an exchange provides a potentially informative function in 
the market by certifying the quality of the companies that it lists.  
 
The data in this report suggest recent changes towards lowering listing standards in the 
U.S., including but not limited to the NASDAQ BX Venture Exchange, are also likely to be 
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associated with changes in the extent and type of observed fraud. The findings in this report by 
themselves do not mean that lower listing standards are inappropriate. However, with these 
findings we are able to determine the extent to which regulations are violated and do give rise to 
the following policy recommendations: 
 
1. Report securities fraud cases committed by companies on an exchange-by-exchange 
basis. The SEC and other securities commissions around the world should report 
securities fraud committed by companies on an exchange basis. Fraud is an investment 
risk that investors should incorporate into their valuation considerations. Without 
appropriate disclosure by securities commissions, investors are not able to systematically 
and correctly estimate the probability of different types of fraud across different 
exchanges, and therefore are not able to appropriately price risk and allocate capital in an 
efficient manner. Currently, there is no exchange or securities commission around the 
world that makes information on fraud committed by officers of listed companies 
available to the public and how such statistics differ across different exchanges within the 
jurisdiction and/or across other jurisdictions. Along with disclosure by securities 
commissions of fraud committed by companies listed on an exchange, it should be made 
clear to investors that the extent to which fraud is detected does not necessarily imply that 
the exchange is failing in its mandate to effort to provide a regulated market for both 
investors and listings, but rather that securities commissions are actively pursuing 
wrongdoers on the exchange for the purpose of enhancing exchange quality. One way to 
report fraud could be to report the difference between the expected level of fraud among 
publicly traded companies each year (for instance, methods to estimate are provided by 
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Wang et al., 2012) and the actual level of detected fraud by exchange. In that way, 
investors would know the extent to which fraud is being undetected across exchanges and 
be able to use such information to price accurately stocks and allocate capital.18 
 
2. Report securities fraud cases committed by investors trading corporate shares on an 
exchange-by-exchange basis. The SEC and other securities commissions around the 
world should report securities fraud committed by investors involving shares of 
companies on an exchange basis. Investors on an exchange should not only be able to 
assess the probability that a company or one of its officers will commit fraud, but they 
should also be able to assess the probability that an unaffiliated investor trading stock 
listed on the exchange will manipulate the price of that stock. Currently, there is no 
exchange or securities commission around the world that makes information on fraud 
involving investors trading corporate stock available to the public and how such statistics 
differ across different exchanges within the jurisdiction and/or across other jurisdictions. 
Along with disclosure by securities commissions of fraud caught on an exchange, it 
should be made clear to investors that more fraud detected does not necessarily imply that 
there is more fraud committed by investors that trade stock that is listed on that exchange, 
but rather that securities commissions are actively pursuing wrongdoers on the exchange 
for the purpose of enhancing exchange quality.  
 
3. Explain and promote market surveillance to investors. Securities commissions should 
disclose the extent of surveillance and efforts to detect fraud by companies listed on 
exchanges and investors trading corporate shares of companies on exchanges, and 
                                                 
18 Criticisms of this approach are that the 7% number is not static over time, and 7% may well be wide of the mark. 
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account for differences across exchanges. This disclosure, however, should not be done 
in a way that would enable would-be market manipulators to adjust their actions to avoid 
detection. Moreover, securities commissions should not destroy records of possible fraud 
that was not followed up to fruition, as has been suggested in 2011 interviews with 
former SEC lawyers (Taibbi, 2011). Investors should be made aware if there are material 
differences in suspected fraud across different exchanges so that they can appropriately 
price risk and make better informed investment decisions. 
 
These policy recommendations are of course not meant to be interpreted as being 
exhaustive or replacing prior policy recommendations on topic. By reporting fraud and steps to 
alleviate fraud, exchanges can proactively take steps to better inform and protect investors above 
and beyond the current status quo. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
The SEC should revisit the way it reports cases of fraud within financial markets to 
investors. There was a time when NASDAQ was considered a relatively risky market, 
particularly around the bursting of the DotCom bubble, and with the recent introduction of the 
relatively riskier NASDAQ BX Venture Market which was approved by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) in May 2011, regulators should be more cognizant of the fact that 
investors should have full information as to the risks associated with investing in different 
exchanges and take steps to better disclose such risks. Having junior stock markets is not 
necessarily a bad thing; on the contrary, junior markets can fill a void in terms of providing 
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smaller and younger firms with greater opportunities to raise capital and investors a greater 
opportunity to diversify their portfolios. Companies listed on and investors in junior stock 
markets however can be better served if there is a reliable source of information pertaining to the 
relative likelihood of different types of fraud on different exchanges so that investors may make 
more informed decisions and better carry out their own due diligence.  
 
In this paper we examined how reduced listing standards reporting requirements for 
companies have worked in the most developed markets in the world, the U.S, the U.K and 
Canada. We also referred to the markets of Brazil, China and Germany for comparison. We 
reported data collected for the first time on differences in fraudulent activity in terms of litigated 
cases of fraud for companies listed on junior versus senior exchanges in these countries. 
Essentially, our motivation for this collection and analysis of data is that we find it rather 
surprising thatthere is little or no direct source of evidence on actual litigated cases of fraud that 
enables an investor to compare the levels of investment risk in different jurisdictions, or even 
different exchanges within the same jurisdiction. 
 
 In the U.S., unless investors carry out the data gathering and analysis that we are 
carrying out here, they may find it almost impossible to compare actual fraud cases on NYSE 
versus NASDAQ, or to draw comparison with the PinkSheets. While Canadian investors may 
refer to annual reports on litigated fraud, there really is no readily available document that 
enables an investor to make comparisons of litigated fraud between the senior TSX versus the 
junior TSXV. Similarly in the U.K., there is no readily available basis to compare litigated fraud 
on the senior LSE with the junior AIM market. This is the first attempt to not only look at 
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differences in fraudulent activity in terms of litigated cases of fraud for companies listed in the 
developed jurisdictions, but more significantly among junior versus senior exchanges. 
 
To examine reported cases of fraud on exchanges in Canada (TSX and TSXV), the U.K. 
(LSE and AIM), and the U.S. (NYSE, NASDAQ and the PinkSheets), we assembled a unique 
dataset by recording court documents and news reports over the period January 2005 to June 
2011. The data collected highlight differences in frequency of litigated cases of fraud depending 
on the country as well as the different levels of the exchanges. For example, regression analyses 
indicated an increase in minimum capitalization requirements by 1-standard deviation is 
associated with a drop by in the total number of initiated fraud cases by 27.4%.  Similarly, a 1-
standard deviation increase in minimum capitalization is associated with a reduction in the total 
number of sanctioned cases by 45.8% relative to the average number of cases in each exchange-
year in the data.  We examined other differences in the data depending on the specific type of 
fraud.  The evidence in this report highlights a need for regulators to account for different levels 
of litigated fraud on different exchanges and to make this information available to average 
investors who seek to understand risks associated with investing in different products. 
 
While more onerous exchange standards may prove too resource-intensive for some 
fund-worthy companies to meet, they do nevertheless give market participants a signal of the 
quality of the exchange and the nature of the companies trading on the exchange. Exchanges are 
thought of as the first-line system of governance to signal quality in terms of screening out 
lower-quality, less-mature listings. Higher standards reduce the probability of having poorly 
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governed companies seeking funding from stock markets and hence lower the probability of 
fraud carried out by companies, to the detriment of investors trading in stock.  
 
Lowering disclosure requirements and exchange listing standards undoubtedly affect the 
ability of an exchange to certify quality to public investors and thereby may have detrimental 
effects on pricing and liquidity. The data in this report suggest recent changes towards lowering 
listing standards in the U.S., including but not limited to the NASDAQ BX Venture Exchange, 
are also likely to be associated with increases in the extent and type of observed fraud. These 
findings by themselves do not mean that lower listing standards are inappropriate. However, with 
these findings we are able to determine the extent to which regulations are violated and seek to 
mitigate the severe and long-lasting damage to companies and investor sentiment by 
implementing targeted policy reforms. 
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